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The Military Revolution Thesis: A 
Comparative Analysis of Early Modern 
Siena, Mantua and Valletta 
Raymond Howard
The Military Revolution thesis has traditionally been associated 
with large states which embraced its changes and achieved 
hegemonic status, while small states have generally been thought 
to lack the pre-requisites required to benefit from the Revolution 
resulting in their marginalisation. This paper attempts to offer an 
alternative dimension to the great-power centric narrative of the 
Military Revolution thesis through the comparative analysis of 
three small states, Siena, Mantua, and Malta, with a particular 
focus on Valletta.  This short paper is inadequate to explore 
the full range of the Military Revolution thus the study will be 
constrained to a single important element within the thesis; a 
comparative evaluation of the trace italienne fortifications 
of Siena, Mantua, and Valletta, and whether these lessened 
the viability of small states, as the case of Siena suggests, or 
bolstered it, as demonstrated by Mantua during the 1620’s.  The 
inclusion of Valletta’s enceinte seeks to add a third element to 
this discussion, shedding light both on the viability of the trace 
italienne as well as Malta’s situation relative to other small 
states.
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The Military Revolution and Small States
Prior to the 1950s there existed a notion among military historians 
that the opening decades of the Early Modern period lacked 
developments in the art of war worth of any major interest.1 
Military historians were content to chronicle battles yet refrained 
from delving deeper into the wider socio-political implications 
of warfare, while social historians wrongly regarded the study 
of tactics and armaments as unconducive to their enquiries. 
Sociologist have generally been more perceptive of warfare’s 
contribution to society, and indeed Charles Tilly claimed that 
‘War made the state, and the state made war’, however most 
historians found the argument distasteful although a compelling 
alternative was not easily provided.2
Michael Roberts ushered a new age in military historiography as 
his thesis of a Military Revolution proposed a clear relationship 
between military developments and the birth of modern 
statehood.3  Roberts’ thesis attracted the attention of a wide cross-
section of scholars rather than appealing exclusively to military 
historians. While matters concerning warfare, specifically the 
development of early modern armies take centre stage, the thesis 
broadened the scope of traditional military history integrating 
matters of bureaucracy, centralisation, and state-formation, thus 
delineating the fundamental principles behind state expansion 
and warfare.4  Roberts’ Military Revolution hinged upon four 
interconnected changes. First, a ‘tactical revolution’ replaced the 
1 Geoffrey Parker, ‘The ‘Military Revolution,’ 1560–1660 – a myth?’, The 
Journal of Modern History, xlviii:2 (1976), 195.  
2 Steven Gunn, David Grummitt, and Hans Cools, ‘War and the State in Early 
Modern Europe: Widening the Debate’, War in History, xv:4 (2008), 372.  
3  Parker (1976), 195.  
4 David Parrot, ‘The Military Revolution in Early Europe’, History Today, 
xlii: 12 (2014), 1.  
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established pike and shot tactics with linear formations which 
maximised the firepower of every unit.5 Second, a ‘strategic 
revolution’ stemmed from the higher quality troops required 
for the new formations, allowing commanders to implement 
more complex strategies, often featuring campaigns with 
multiple armies operating synchronically.6 Third, the capability 
of mobilising and integrating several armies into a larger 
composite force necessitated a significantly larger quantity of 
men thus escalating the scale of warfare throughout Europe.7 
Finally, Roberts demonstrated how the recruitment and upkeep 
of these vast armies created an unprecedented strain upon 
governmental structures which had to adopt a policy of large 
scale centralisation through the establishment of dedicated 
bureaucracies.8  Financing these new administrative bodies 
compelled governments to extract capital in an increasingly 
efficacious manner, formulating the physiognomy of a modern 
state established upon a creditary economic system.9
Fundamentally, the Military Revolution thesis exhibits a 
dualistic nature; those states which embraced its qualities 
accessed the ‘great powers club’, while those that failed its test 
were quickly absorbed by their expansionist neighbours. The 
association between large states and the Military Revolution 
is unsurprising, so much so as to make the inclusion of small 
states seem a fruitless exercise.10 This is not the case. Evaluating 
5 Michael Roberts, Essays in Swedish History, (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1967), 196; Parrot (2014), 2.  
6 Roberts (1967), 203; Parker (1976), 196–197.  
7 Roberts (1967), 203–204; Parker (1976), 197.  
8 Parrot (2014), 3.
9 Parker (1976), 197.
10 Raymond Howard, ‘The Military Revolution: The Case of Early Modern 
Malta’, (Unpublished B.A. Hons. Dissertation, University of Malta, 2017), 51. 
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the links between small states and the Military Revolution 
enriches the ongoing debate and demonstrates that the thesis 
does not inherently exclude small states, although these did 
not necessarily develop into a hegemonic power. For such an 
exercise to be possible a more flexible approach is required 
in order to circumvent the dichotomy between success and 
failure within the debate, while preserving the core features of 
the thesis.  Rather than utilising the Military Revolution as a 
standardised criterion for quantifying a states’ military power, 
a more natural process allowing greater tolerance for variability 
should be adopted.11  The study of early modern fortifications is 
a great opportunity to demonstrate the relevance of small states. 
Indeed the study of military architecture holds an important 
place in Military Revolution historiography.  Geoffrey Parker, 
John Lynn and Adam Smith have identified how the trace 
italienne style fortifications, apart from curtailing the efficacy 
of gun powder artillery, proved to be an important component in 
the enlargement of early modern armies.12  
11 Howard (2017), 52. 
12 Howard (2017), 16–25. 
Fig. 1. Elevation 
view of trace 
italienne 
fortifications. 
(See also p. 136)
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The bastioned trace was an expensive piece of technology, not 
only because of the physical cost of materials and construction, 
but also because of its impact upon a state’s army. Furthermore 
the trace italienne left its mark upon the political world as 
European political geography became highly attuned to the 
existence of frontier fortresses, essentially defining a state by its 
pacified (unfortified) interior and a heavily fortified exterior.13 
Traditionally, small states lacked both the wealth and the 
territory for widespread border fortifications, instead opting 
for a strategically positioned fortress or fortified city.  Indeed a 
prevailing point of contention among historians revolves around 
whether the trace italienne bolstered the viability of small 
states, as Mantua in the 1620s would suggest, or lessened it, 
as showcased in Siena throughout the 1550’s.  The following 
sections explore this issue comparatively by introducing the case 
of Hospitaller Malta, together with those of Siena and Mantua, 
demonstrating if and how small states could benefit from aspects 
of the Military Revolution.
13 Thomas Francis Arnold, ‘Fortifications and Statecraft of the Gonzaga, 1530–
1630’, (Unpublished PhD dissertation, Ohio State University 1993), 63.
Fig. 2. Side view 
of trace italienne 
fortifications. 
(See also p. 137)
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Siena
The Italian Wars (1494–1559) acquainted the medieval 
fortifications of Italian city states with the destructive power of 
gunpowder artillery, resulting in the development of the trace 
italienne as an anti-artillery defence system.  The Habsburg-
Valois rivalry unfolding on the Italian peninsula, together with 
the endemic factionalism consuming Siena’s ruling class, acted 
as the motive force behind the republic’s need for an elaborate 
defence network.  Indeed the alliance between an exiled Sienese 
faction and Pope Clement VII (r.1523-1534) resulted in the 
unsuccessful siege of 1526 which acted as the catalyst behind 
Baldassarre Peruzzi’s fortifications.14
The late 1520s harboured considerable threats for Siena’s 
independence inducing the ruling faction to embark on a 
modernisation scheme of Siena’s medieval enceinte under the 
direction of the Sienese architect Peruzzi.  He was directed to 
devise a system through which troops could move around the 
enceinte while retaining cover from incoming fire, as well as 
to reinforce the existing walls with bastions.  Although Peruzzi 
did make provisions for protected movement, his principal work 
was the bastion constructed besides each of the five gates.15 
The largest bastion was built at the Sportello di San Prospero 
which Peruzzi identified as a problematic area due to the damage 
inflicted during the siege.  Peruzzi’s bastions seem to have 
developed rather quickly with a total estimated building time 
of five years from 1527 to 1532.  Although there is a lack of 
documentation detailing the exact date of construction for each 
14 Simon Pepper and Nicholas Adams, Firearms & Fortifications Military 
Architecture and Siege Warfare in Sixteenth–Century Siena (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1986), xviii.
15 Pepper and Adams (1986), 37-38.
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bastion, scholars believe that by 1529 work was being carried out 
simultaneously on all of the five bastions.  Indeed by 1528 the 
work had already progressed enough to attract the attention of 
several eminent ambassadors who remarked upon the bastion’s 
strength.16  Siena’s economy suffered due to the financial strains 
imposed by the project.  In 1529 Charles V’s (1500-1558) stay 
in Siena, and the celebrations planned for his coronation as Holy 
Roman Emperor, diverted the money intended for fortifications 
towards the decoration of the city.  Siena could not hope to 
finance both projects at once hinting at the costs of the new 
bastions despite being relatively small-scale works.17
Despite Peruzzi’s bastions the majority of Siena’s enceinte 
remained medieval in nature and in 1549 the Spanish authorities 
commissioned the building of a citadel overlooking the city. The 
Sienese recognized this manoeuvre for what it was; direct Imperial 
intervention in a bid to stabilize a turbulent city state within their 
orbit.18  The Spanish citadel was planned to be a three bastioned 
fortress with two demi-bastions at the extremities creating a 
hornwork projecting towards the city. Charles V decreed that 
construction of the citadel and maintenance of its Spanish 
garrison were to be funded by the Sienese.19 The Sienese were 
well aware that building the citadel entailed enormous expenses. 
Acquisition of the necessary finances could only be secured 
through drastic measures threatening the existing liberties and 
rights of the Sienese. Indeed the required revenue was raised 
through the abuse of power: forced loans, misappropriation of 
funds envisioned for coastal fortifications, and forced labour 
16 Pepper and Adams (1986), 56. 
17 Pepper and Adams (1986), 57.
18 Simon Pepper, ‘Sword and Spade: Military Construction in Renaissance 
Italy’, Construction History, xvi (2000), 24.
19 Pepper and Adams (1986), 58, 66.
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became the order of the day.20  Nevertheless, construction plans 
went ahead forcing the Sienese into open rebellion; with French 
aid, they expelled the Spanish. After the revolt, a committee was 
setup with the aim to destroy the citadel, however, the council 
decided to retain it albeit with some modifications.  The initial 
design was amended; the demi-bastions were demolished and 
the rubble reused to complete the outward bastions integrating 
them with the existing medieval enceinte.21  Siena’s shift 
from Spanish to French influence failed to address the city’s 
bankruptcy. Indeed the French used the same methods as 
their predecessors to gain the funds required to complete the 
remodelled citadel.22  Now facing a Spanish counter attack, 
Siena only achieved the minimal defences required to withstand 
a war, despite the herculean effort to mobilise its resources. 
While the modernisation of the city’s defences proved daunting, 
the defence of the wider state was more problematic and costly 
as none of the fortification projects undertaken outside the city 
had been completed when the first invasion began. Furthermore 
in an effort to reduce costs any fortifications outside the city 
were only bolstered with earthworks.23 
Considering that Siena contributed the most during the war effort, 
although its vassal towns played their part, one might be tempted 
to speak of an early modern state imposing its centralized will 
upon its dependencies.  Such a model does not fit the Sienese case 
as its defence was shackled by several regional factors.  Despite 
the appointment of several military architects, suggesting a 
level of professional specialisation employed by modern 
20 Judith Hook, ‘Fortifications and the end of the Sienese State’, History, lxii, 
206 (1977), 375, 376.
21 Pepper (2000), 25, 26.
22 Hook (1977), 375.
23 Hook (1977), 378, 380.
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states, Siena’s administration depended upon local volunteers 
to guarantee the construction of the forts.  Consequently any 
progress regarding fortification schemes depended upon the 
determination of individual towns to see the project through, 
as well as their friendliness towards Siena.24  While Siena’s 
bankruptcy hindered any attempts at modernisation, the timing 
in which these projects were initiated was grossly inadequate. 
Imminent attack by a combined Spanish-Florentine force 
stretched Siena’s already limited man-power to its limits as its 
labourers were dispersed working on several small forts at once. 
The sheer costs of its fortifications deprived Siena from raising 
an army large enough to break her enemies’ blockade, forcing 
her to rely on French aid for supplies and soldiers; when these 
failed to materialise on time Siena succumbed to starvation, 
defeat, and loss of independence.25 
Mantua
If the loss of Siena’s independence has been used as an argument 
against the viability of the trace italienne for the defence of a 
small state, the Mantuan case quickly assumed the opposite 
end of the spectrum.  Francesco IV Gonzaga (1484–1519), a 
Mantuan Marquis, inherited from his predecessors a typical 
medieval fortified city, whose enceinte comprised of a high, but 
narrow curtain wall circumscribing the city interspersed with a 
number of square towers, and the late-medieval style Castello di 
San Giorgio.  Mantuan defences were ill equipped to withstand 
artillery bombardment forcing the Gonzaga to embark upon a 
process of modernisation.  Early sixteenth-century military 
architecture was characterised by experimentation; the angled 
24 Hook (1977), 385-386.
25 Hook (1977), 387.
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bastion was not yet the conventional solution to the problem of 
gunpowder artillery. Naturally the initial round of fortification 
construction around Mantua exhibited several transitional 
elements between the medieval traditions and the anti-artillery 
properties of thick, low, earthworks.26
The military veteran Alessio Beccaguto designed and oversaw 
the construction of the new fortifications.  Beccaguto’s design 
featured new walls which were to be lower, thicker and reinforced 
by recurrent buttresses, however, the most progressive aspect of 
his design was the inclusion of three large circular artillery towers. 
These were built level with the walls but projected outwards, 
providing a powerful field of fire dominating the surrounding 
territory.  Beccaguto’s artillery towers were a transitional form of 
bastioned fortifications, although the principle of enfilading fire, 
the cornerstone of the trace italienne, was not yet implemented. 
Mantua’s southern perimeter was the first to be modernised in 
this fashion, however, Beccaguto planned to apply his design to 
encompass all of Mantua’s enceinte.  Nevertheless, Beccaguto’s 
master plan failed to materialise and only the fortifications of the 
southern perimeter were fortified in this manner.  Construction 
work was often intermittent as lack of funds and a shortage of 
mortar and lime disrupted the project.  Indeed, the construction 
of the Cerese gate and its adjacent wall was estimated to cost a 
total of 16,000 ducats, while in his master plan, Beccaguto had 
estimated a sum of 18,000 to 20,000 ducats for the fortifications 
of the whole eastern section of the city.27  The lack of natural 
resources in the vicinity of Mantua further exacerbated these 
enormous costs.  Despite the relative ease with which stone was 
transported over Mantua’s waterways, the costs of importation 
26  Arnold (1993), 87, 93–94.
27  Arnold (1993), 96-98, 102-103.
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were high and the nature of the project dictated vast quantities of 
raw material. The sheer volume of manual labour required was 
another factor draining the Mantuan treasury and every quarter 
of the city was expected to provide unskilled labourers.28
Beccaguto’s fortifications were finished in 1528, however, none 
of his other plans materialised since the principles delineating 
Mantua’s defence changed completely.  The Gonzaga invested 
seventy years of intermittent work in modernising their city.  An 
analysis of this decades-long process reveals two major trends 
playing themselves out; the increasing reliance upon the angled 
bastion as the optimal defensive system, and a dwindling interest 
in ambitious schemes of modernising whole cities.29  The latter 
had proven impossible to fund and consequently fortification 
projects focused upon strengthening specific areas of Mantua’s 
perimeter.  The Gonzaga’s next project was the construction of the 
citadel which completely embraced the angled bastion system. 
Indeed the citadel was shaped roughly as a regular polygon 
with four bastions providing mutual flanking fire. Building the 
citadel proved to be a massive enterprise, requiring around forty 
years to complete despite being much smaller than Beccaguto’s 
proposed enceinte.30  Although the citadel further modernised 
Mantua’s defences it failed to offer a comprehensive solution as 
several areas within the city remained unprotected.  In a bid to 
rectify this, the San Giorgio bastion was commissioned with the 
intention to defend the San Giorgio causeway and the lower lake 
although the bastion was not enough to safeguard the suburb. 
The construction of both the citadel and the San Giorgio bastion 
followed the same pattern established during the construction of 
28 Arnold (1993), 103, 104.
29 Arnold (1993), 137.
30 Arnold (1993), 118.
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Beccaguto’s fortifications.  Construction was slow and sporadic 
owing to the lack of resources and finances, while a good labour 
force was not always easy to obtain.  Furthermore, there were 
periods when work halted completely as was the case following 
the death of Duke Federigo in 1542.  The fortification projects 
clearly show that until the 1590s, the Gonzaga lacked the money 
to finish their projects on schedule, although by the 1530s, Italy 
was relatively pacified and thus the Gonzaga lacked any sense 
of urgency.31
The sixteenth century saw the increasing sophistication of 
Mantuan fortifications although the Gonzaga had been forced 
to settle for a compromise.  The Gonzaga chose to modernise 
specific sections of their defences while the majority of Mantua’s 
border remained defended by medieval walls, although, in a crisis, 
these could be bolstered by earthworks at a much lower cost 
than permanent fortifications.  Nevertheless, these fortifications 
coupled with the natural defences provided by Mantua’s rivers 
made the city one of Europe’s sturdiest strongholds.  While 
no fortification scheme is wholly impregnable, Mantua’s 
fortifications, if used wisely as a component within a much 
wider diplomatic policy, could provide political independence 
to a small state surrounded by larger and stronger expansionist 
neighbours.32  The policies pursued by Duke Carlo of Mantua 
show a break with his predecessor’s dependence on foreign aid 
from Spain or any other greater prince, as Duke Carlo relied upon 
his own military strength and his fortresses to oppose the claims 
of his opponents.  The Mantuan War (1628-1630) was the final 
test of this independence where Mantua’s fortifications resisted 
the Imperial army in 1629.  Indeed the fall of Mantua in 1630 
31  Arnold (1993), 136-138.
32  Arnold (1993), 343.
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is largely attributed to the plague, rather than any fault with the 
defences of the city itself.  Nevertheless, the Peace of Regensburg 
ratified in the same year reconfirmed the independence of Mantua 
to the great humiliation of Emperor Ferdinand II (r.1619-1637) 
and his ally the Spanish monarch Phillip IV (r.1621-1665).33 
The Mantuan case is an excellent example of how a new military 
innovation central to the Military Revolution thesis, far from 
being limited to great powers, redefined the political and military 
existence of smaller European powers. 
Valletta
The conditions surrounding Valletta’s construction are quite 
peculiar when compared to the Sienese and Mantuan cases. 
While Siena’s enceinte was modernised in anticipation of a siege, 
and Mantua’s fortification project was a long term peace-time 
investment which paid dividends in war, Valletta was built from 
scratch following a large invasion, expected to resume during 
spring.  Upon its arrival on Malta, the Order of St John identified 
Birgu as their seat of power, however its obsolete defences and 
vulnerability to enemy artillery motivated the Order to search 
for a more defendable candidate.34 Several military engineers 
proposed the construction of a fortified city upon the Sciberras 
peninsula, however, these proposals were never sanctioned and 
the Order settled with repairing the existing fortifications.35  In 
the aftermath of the Siege of 1565, the Order faced a dilemma; 
the island’s economy was ruined, the treasury empty, and 
the Ottomans were expected to resume the invasion come 
33 Arnold (1993), 344-345.
34 Howard (2017), 23.
35 NLM = (National Library of Malta) AOM = (Archive of the Order of 
Malta) 286, f.59.
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springtime.  The need of a new fortress city was felt more than 
ever, however, the economic impediments which had previously 
postponed plans for the city had increased exponentially.36 
Building a fortified city from scratch certainly seemed daunting 
and yet no real alternative existed.  By rebuilding the old forts 
the Order would not have improved its strategic position; the 
existing fortresses were too small and restricted by geography to 
benefit from the advantages of trace italienne style fortifications, 
while the cost of rebuilding the old forts was estimated to equal 
that of building the new city.37
Grand Master Jean de Valette committed himself to raise a 
fortified city on the Sciberras peninsula and tasked the Order’s 
envoys in Europe to procure the engineer Baldassare Lanci 
to initiate work on the city he had already designed in 1562. 
Tensions between Grand Duke Cosimo de Medici (r.1537-1569) 
and de Valette, coupled with the deteriorating relations between 
Spain and the Order, ensured denial of Lanci’s services38 resulting 
in the appointment of Francesco Laparelli.39 Laparelli took into 
account the Order’s financial and political situation in his design 
for Valletta’s fortifications.  He was well aware that any project 
the Order undertook would have to be completed in a limited 
timeframe to account for the possibility of a second Ottoman 
invasion.  This excluded his initial plan of enclosing the Marsa 
spring behind the Valletta front, and in turn the highest area of 
the Sciberras hill was chosen as the optimal candidate for the 
36 Alison Hoppen, The Fortification of Malta by the Order of St. John 1530–
1798 (Malta: Mireva Publications, 1999), 49.
37 Hoppen (1999), 49; Howard (2017), 27.
38 Roger Vella Bonavita, ‘A Gentleman of Cortona: The Life and Achievements 
of Capitano Francesco Laparelli da Cortona (1521 – 1570)’, (Unpublished 
PhD dissertation, University of Malta, 2011), 252
39 NLM AOM430, f.268v.
69
siting of his front.40  Laparelli’s chosen site restricted the area on 
which an invader could establish artillery batteries thus reducing 
Valletta’s exposure to frontal bombardments.  Valletta’s front 
consisted of four bastions connected with curtain walls on top 
of which towered two cavaliers surrounded by a ditch.  The 
city’s lateral walls were designed to be high enough to protect 
Valletta’s interior, and to intersect with the fortress of St Elmo. 
In order to reduce expenses and construction time, Laparelli 
opted to carve out the bastions from living rock wherever 
possible while masonry would be used where the terrain 
prevented such methods.41  Despite a shortage of workmen 
and finances, construction seemed to have progressed steadily, 
although Laparelli himself was fearful that the city would not be 
made defendable in time.  Indeed Laparelli estimated that, with 
4,000 workers at his disposal, Valletta could be made defendable 
in twelve months’ time, although it would take a further year 
for the whole enceinte to be built and many more years for the 
whole city to be completed.42  
No surviving document clearly defines how much Valletta’s 
construction cost the Order, although a 1568 estimate provides 
the sum of 200,000 scudi for the work already completed while 
the remaining fortifications and public buildings would require 
another 200,000 scudi.  This was a great expense when the 
estimates of the Order’s yearly revenue amounted to 116,732 
scudi.43  The Order judiciously monitored fortification-related 
expenditures including the wages of all skilled workers it 
employed.  These were usually employed on a contractual basis 
40 Hoppen (1999), 56; Vella Bonavita (2011), 263
41 Hoppen (1999), 58.
42 Hoppen (1999), 61.
43 Hoppen (1999), 256.
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and paid a fixed rate, determined by the complexity of the work, 
per cane.44  Similarly to Mantua, building materials were the 
main items of expenditure, despite the ample supply of locally 
procured masonry thus avoiding shipping costs.  Nevertheless, 
Malta’s lack of natural resources required the importation of 
iron, mortar, wood, and other material.  Documentary evidence 
regarding material costs is scarce, however, what exists hints 
that raw material may have accounted for three quarters of the 
total expenditure while the remaining quarter was allocated to 
the craftsmen’s wages.45  It is necessary to question the ability 
of the Order’s financial system to cover the expenses incurred 
by fortress construction.  The Order’s major source of revenue 
came from its foreign properties leaving the Order at the mercy 
of international crises often resulting in the loss of responsions, 
the income from its landed estates spread across Europe.  This 
deficiency, coupled with the financial strains of warfare, would 
under normal circumstances prohibit the Order from funding a 
project such as Valletta.46  
The Order, in fact, financed the project by capitalising on its 
victory and morphing it into a public relations exercise where it 
presented itself as the defender of Christendom thus highlighting 
its relevance as the gatekeeper to Europe.  This carefully 
crafted image resonated with the princes of Europe; Charles IX 
(r.1560-1574) of France donated 140,000 livres tournois, Philip 
II (r.1556-1598) of Spain 30,000 scudi, Pope Pius V (r.1566-
1572) 15,000 scudi, and Sebastian of Portugal (r.1557-1578) 
30,000 cruzados.  Furthermore, Laparelli himself had to engage 
500 men at his own expense to supplement the lack of workers 
44  NLM AOM116, f.263
45  NLM AOM1016, f.6.
46  Howard (2017), 54-55. 
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building the city, while the pope and Phillip II provided 6,000 
soldiers to guard the workers in case of attack.47
A wider look at Hospitaller fortification history shows that 
Valletta was very much a unique case.  Any further fortification 
projects the Order embarked upon after Valletta’s construction 
failed to attract foreign financial support on a similar scale and 
were financed almost exclusively by the Order.  The Order 
lacked a comprehensive long-term plan for the fortification of the 
harbour area.  Fortification projects were mostly commissioned 
after reports of possible invasions and the Council frequently 
sanctioned highly ambitious schemes it would struggle to 
complete.  The situation would be exacerbated when doubt 
would assail the Council after the commencement of a project, 
inducing it to halt one project and embark upon another resulting 
in a number of grandiose schemes which the Order could never 
finance.48  Despite this mismanagement of resources, work on 
the harbour fortifications dragged on sporadically until they were 
completed by the eighteenth century, creating a truly formidable 
defence system.  Even more significant than the completion 
of the harbour fortifications was Valletta’s construction as it 
cemented the Order’s commitment to Malta and safeguarded 
the Order’s pretentions of independence.  While no fortification 
scheme could ever make a state immune to invasion, the trace 
italienne certainly made a small state politically viable.
Conclusion: Points of Comparison
Geoffrey Parker identified the trace italienne as the motive 
force behind the military changes outlined by Roberts.  The 
47  Hoppen (1999), 51, 60, 243.
48  Howard (2017), 29-30.
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bastioned trace’s anti-artillery properties changed the military 
geography of the early modern period, forcing warring states 
into a struggle over strongholds, since it was control over the 
latter which dictated the dominance of a contested region.49  The 
changes in military architecture had an impact upon the policies 
of governments forcing them to adapt to the changes in warfare. 
The Military Revolution thesis posits that states had to create 
dedicated bureaucracies to extract the capital required to finance 
this new method of warfare.  These bureaucracies assumed 
the roles traditionally fulfilled by private military contractors, 
creating the centralised modern state.50  The links between 
military change and state growth proved to be harder to trace 
than Roberts proposed, often resulting in a situation where case-
studies are traded in order to argue opposite cases.51  Such have 
been the Sienese and Mantuan cases prompting this study to 
include the case of Hospitaller Malta in an attempt to overcome 
this stalemate.  Despite the limits imposed by the brevity of this 
paper, some patterns emerged providing useful insights.
Siena, Mantua, and Malta all share several features.  All three are 
relatively small states, surrounded by expansionist neighbours 
and subject to the machinations of the larger powers.  For Siena 
and Mantua this was the Franco-Habsburg rivalry playing itself 
out in northern Italy, while for the Order and Malta it was the 
Spanish-Ottoman rivalry over the Mediterranean.  The three 
states were practically independent and sought to retain that 
independence through the modernisation or construction of 
fortifications.  It is generally agreed that the trace italienne 
was too costly in relation to sixteenth-century social and 
49 Parker (1976), 203, 204, 206.
50 Hook (1977), 373; Howard (2017), 8; Parker (1976), 197.
51 Gunn, Grummitt and Cools (2008), 373.  
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economic developments, prohibiting feudal governments from 
commissioning modern fortification schemes.52  This is visible in 
all three states as they all struggled to finance their fortifications; 
Siena’s modernisation project bankrupted the state leaving her 
unable to raise an army, while construction work on the Mantuan 
fortifications was slow and sporadic due to the lack of resources 
and finances.  The harbour fortifications on Malta followed a 
similar pattern and work only progressed when the Order’s 
finances permitted.  Valletta proved to be the exception to the 
rule due to the financial aid the Order received from foreign 
patrons.  Nevertheless, only the fortifications were built rapidly; 
the remainder of the city took years to complete.  The prohibitive 
cost of the trace italienne ensured the avoidance of large-scale 
modernisation schemes; Laparelli reduced his initial plan for 
Valletta’s size, while both Siena and Mantua chose to integrate 
several bastions with the existing medieval walls instead of 
encircling whole cities with new enceintes.  
Interestingly, these fortification projects failed to create a 
centralised state.  Siena’s fiscal system remained decidedly 
medieval, leading to her bankruptcy and loss of independence, 
while the Order started developing a more systematic fiscal 
state during the eighteenth century.53 While Siena’s loss of 
independence can be attributed to its fortifications, Mantua and 
Hospitaller Malta retained their independence partly because of 
them.  Indeed, the Sienese example does not prove that small 
states were unable to benefit from the bastioned trace but rather 
that modern fortifications were not enough to secure a state’s 
independence.  Mantua and Malta succeeded in guaranteeing 
52 Hook (1977), 373.
53  Bellizzi, Louis, ‘The Cost of Providing Hospital Care in Malta 1733-1798’, 
(Unpublished M.A. dissertation, University of Malta, 2013).
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their independence precisely because their fortifications were 
subsumed in a wider diplomatic policy.  The Mantuan fortifications 
allowed the Gonzaga princes to overcome their dependence 
on Spanish military aid.  When a Spanish army invaded, the 
fortresses of Mantua held long enough to enable the signing of a 
Franco-Mantuan alliance forcing Spain to divert resources from 
the campaign in the Netherlands. The independence of Mantua 
was finally recognised in the Peace of Regensburg dealing the 
final humiliation to the Habsburgs.  While Malta never suffered 
another Ottoman siege, Valletta was constructed under the threat 
of a renewed campaign during the spring.  By the end of the 
1565 siege, the Order’s finances were depleted, Malta’s economy 
disrupted, and its defences ruined.  The remaining fortifications 
were so obsolete that they could only withstand a second siege 
for a brief span of time and at great human cost, a price which the 
Order could not afford.  Indeed, plans were made to abandon the 
island and retire to Rome should a second Ottoman army invade.54 
This approach would have definitely shattered any pretensions of 
independence the Order had, for how could they claim sovereignty 
without their own state? The need of a new fortified city could 
not have been clearer.  Indeed Valletta’s construction cemented 
the Order’s commitment to make most out of their new territorial 
possession.  Valletta’s construction would have been impossible 
had the Order not been adept enough to pursue a diplomatic policy 
crafted to obtain financial and military support from European 
monarchs.  Indeed it is only through the patronage of its foreign 
benefactors that the Order managed to safeguard its island state 
and aspirations of sovereignty through fortification projects.
54 Giacomo Bosio, Historia della Sacra Religione Militare di S. Giovanni 
Gerosolmitano, (Venice, 1695), III, 741. Hoppen (1999), 49–50; Vella 
Bonavita (2011), 262, 339.
